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ARTICLES
ON THE POSSIBILITY OF NECESSITY IN
LEGAL ARGUMENT: A DILEMMA FOR
HOLMES AND DEWEY
SCOTT BREWER*
When someone in his audience said, Convince me that logic is
necessary, he answered: Do you wish me to demonstrate this to
you?-Yes.-Well, then, must I use a demonstrative argument?-And
when the questioner had agreed to that, Epictetus asked him, How,
then, will you know if I impose upon you?-As the man had no
answer to give, Epictetus said: Do you see how you yourself admit
that all this instruction is necessary, if, without it, you cannot so
much as know whether it is necessary or not?
Arrian's Discourses of Epictetus, Chapter XXV: "How Is Logic
Necessary?"
INTRODUCTION: DEWEY, HOLMES, AND "ANTI-DEDUCTIVISM" IN

LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL PEDAGOGY
Brooding omnipresently over American legal pedagogy and
jurisprudence for nearly a century now has been the Holmesian
mantra "the life of the law has not been logic. It has been
experience." In his influential essay The Path of the Law, Holmes
expressed this claim about the role of "logic" in rather
intellectually strident terms. He maintained that there were two
"first principles for the study of this body of dogma or
systematized prediction which we call the law," the first of which
was that legal and moral obligation must be kept strictly
analytically separate (the "separation thesis"), and second, that
law is not a deductively applicable axiomatic system. He went on
to maintain that to deny this second thesis is to commit the "the
fallacy of logical form"l-a "fallacy" that consisted in "the notion
that the only force at work in the development of the law is logic."
Holmes left a canon of widely varied, brilliant, fertile, poetic,
insightful writings on legal doctrine, legal pedagogy, and
Professor, Harvard Law School.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465
(1879).
*
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jurisprudence.
In his intellectual assault on "logic," Holmes
clearly had in mind deductive logic, 2 although he displayed none
too thorough a knowledge of what "logic" is-deductive or
otherwise-or how it operated in the dynamics of legal argument.!
His challenge to the view, allegedly regnant in the legal theory
and legal pedagogy of his day, that "logic" is the life of the law,
came to serve as one of the central tenets of the legal realist
reaction to the intellectual vices of "formalism" and "mechanical
jurisprudence," and thus has been among Holmes' most enduring
and influential contributions.
It is not to my purpose in this essay to discuss in detail the
strengths
and weaknesses of Holmes' arguments and claims about
"logic."4 Rather, I want to offer an explicitly and deliberately
narrow argument against what I regard as a fellow-traveling antideductivist argument. The argument I have in mind is advanced
by John Dewey in his essay "Logical Method and the Law." I
believe it is fair to say (but I'll leave this to intellectual historians)
that Dewey's version of what I shall call the "anti-deductivist"
explanation of American legal argument has been deeply
influential, in part because it is (and Dewey clearly intended it to
be) a philosophically careful exposition of Holmes' anti-deductivist
theme. With that as my reason for targeting Dewey's argument, I
shall offer what I regard as two decisive arguments to show that
the Dewey (and perhaps, the "Deweyfied" Holmes) thesis about
deductive logic in legal argument is incorrect.
I hasten to emphasize the narrowness of my task. As I shall
explain, Dewey argues that legal argument cannot be explained as
arguments that have valid deductive structures (like "modus
ponens"-"All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore
Socrates is mortal"). My goal in this essay is only to show that
Dewey's arguments are internally incoherent and for that reason
unconvincing. Toward the end of the essay I go a bit further and
provide a model to show how it is at least logically possible to
explain the practice of American legal argument by reconstructing
the arguments of judges and lawyers as deductive arguments,
some valid, some invalid. I leave to extended discussion elsewhere
the question whether, in what ways, and to what extent
interpretations of legal arguments as having a deductive structure
offer the best explanation of those arguments.
But before I engage Dewey directly, I want to call attention to

2. See text at note 35.
3. See Scott Brewer, Traversing Holmes' Path toward a Jurisprudenceof
Logical Form, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Steve Burton ed. 2000) [hereinafter Brewer,
Jurisprudenceof Logical Form].
4. It is to my purpose in Brewer, Jurisprudence of Logical Form, supra

note 3.
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what seems to me to be some useful evidence of the effects of
Dewey's and Holmes' "anti-logic" thesis on the generations of
lawyers, legal academics, and judges that followed them. Again, I
note that I shall leave to intellectual historians the question of the
extent to which this evidence of putative influence is evidence of
actual influence. But the influence claim seems pretty plausible to
me given Holmes' and Dewey's stature among many generations of
jurists.
What influence do I claim? Following Holmes and Dewey
(and indeed also like Holmes, though, to be sure, much less like
Dewey) many generations of jurists (especially the academic
phalanx) have given no serious attention to the role of logic in
legal argument, while at the same time, by word or by deed,
dismissing it as a serious subject for teaching and analysis in law
school. I suggest that this more or less universal dismissal has
had the pernicious "trickle up" effect of dulling the precision and
clarity and perspicacity of legal arguments offered by judges and
lawyers, from those penned and printed by state court judges and
lawyers to those issued by the United States Supreme Court. And while I do not believe that logic is the most important
discipline a jurist (teacher, student, judge, scholar) should have, I
do believe that it is a discipline whose competent mastery is vital
for any jurist. In that way, Holmes' and Dewey's influence in this
area should be regarded as pernicious.
I.

THE TRICKLE-UP EFFECTS OF ANTI-DEDUCTIVISM:

TWO "CASE"

STUDIES

A. Joyner v. Adams
Joyner v. Adams,' a fairly recent dispute about the meaning
of a contract provision, offers a clear example of deductive logical
failure in a judicial decision. Although the particulars of the
example are hardly momentous in the grander scheme of the life of
the law, the example is still illuminating in many respects.
The relevant issue in Joyner arose from an agreement
according to which the defendant (developer and lessee) would
"develop," by a specified date, land owned by plaintiff (owner and
lessor), and pay the plaintiff a specific amount of rent on that land.
In the event that the defendant failed to "develop" the land by the
specified date, he would have to pay a higher rent. By the time
the dispute worked its way up to the North Carolina Court of
5. 361 S.E.2d 902 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
6. More precisely, but also more obscurely, the defendant "agreed to pay a
fixed rate until 30 September 1980, at which time he was obligated to have
subdivided 'all of the undeveloped land... whereby all portions are deemed
lots and eligible for the execution of a [Lot Lease].'" 361 S.E.2d at 902.
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Appeals, the issue was just how much "development" was required
under the agreement-i.e., what the meaning of the "development"
requirement was.'
What interests me here is the Joyner court's analysis of the
applicable legal rule for deciding "whose meaning prevails" in a
dispute about the meaning of a contract provision. The court
seems to have thought that it was simply restating, albeit in
different terms, the exact requirements of Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 201(2), whose authority the court acknowledged.8 The
court expresses its restated version of the (Restatement (Second))
rule as follows:
It is also well-established, although not often enunciated in North
Carolina cases, that, where one party knows or has reason to know
what the other party means by certain language and the other party
does not know or have reason to know of the meaning attached to
the disputed language by the first party, the court will enforce the
contract in accordance with the innocent party's meaning. See
Insurance Agency v. Leasing Corp., 31 N.C. App. 490, 229 S.E. 2d
697 (1976); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, sections 20, 201(2)

7. The court of appeals stated:
The other two memoranda, one written by defendant's negotiator, Mr.
Ed Clark, referred to the "completed development" of the property as a
possible condition to avoiding rent escalation. Mr. Lynch testified that
he and Mr. Joyner interpreted "completed development" to mean the
construction of all buildings. In addition, plaintiff testified that she
expressed to defendant her wish that the contract contain a more
specific provision regarding the construction of buildings on the lots.
This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that
plaintiff intended the provision in question to require defendant at least
to have begun construction of all buildings on the lots. Defendant
argues that, when read in conjunction with the terms of the Base Lease,
his interpretation is the only reasonable interpretation of the rent
escalation provision.
That argument was rejected in this court's
previous decision in this case. The law of the case is that the language in
the amendment is ambiguous and susceptible to more than one
reasonable meaning, even when considered with the terms of the Base
Lease. Contrary to plaintiffs contention, there is also evidence that
defendant attributeda different meaning to the disputed provision.
Id. at 903-04 (emphasis added).
8. It is helpful, but not critical for my purpose here, that the court believed
this. Of course, one ought to read with warranted charity. Perhaps the court
was simply offering what it fully realized was a version of the "whose meaning
prevails" rule that differed significantly from that of the Restatement
provision it cited. But if that is indeed what the court thought, it is perhaps
fair to fault it for unclarity on this point. But, all things, including warranted
charity considered, I do think the court intended to adopt the requirements of
the Restatement rule and only inadvertently misstated those requirements.
Apart from the evidence of the court's "text itself," there is the fact that that
North Carolina case it cites in the text to this note itself directly quotes the
first Restatement precursor version of § 201(2). See 229 S.E.2d at 700.
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(1979); 3 Corbin, Contracts, section 537 (1960 and Supp.1984). 9

The Joyner court here offers two closely related rules to
govern and guide the analysis of "whose meaning prevails" under
North Carolina contract law.
(1) In a reasonable dispute between parties A and B
about the meaning of a contract provision," if A is
innocent and B is non-innocent, then the court will
assign A's meaning to the disputed term in the

contract."
(2) A party to a contract is "innocent"only if that party
neither knows nor has reason to know that the
other party attaches a different meaning to the
disputed term in a contract.
Compare Joyner's rules (1) and (2) to the "whose meaning
prevails" rule in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201(2).
Slightly re-presented (to make its deductive structure
perspicuous), that rule is as follows:
(3) If parties A and B have attached different meanings
to a promise or agreement or a term thereof, then
it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning
attached by A if and only if, 12 at the time the
agreement was made,
A did not actually know of any different meaning
attached by B, and B actually knew of the meaning
attached by the first party
or
9. 361 S.E.2d at 905 (emphasis added).
10. I include this qualification in the antecedent to the rule to capture a
judgment the judge clearly thought important to his analysis under the whose
meaning prevails rule, namely, "The law of the case is that the language in
the amendment is ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reasonable
meaning, even when considered with the terms of the Base Lease." Joyner,
361 S.E.2d at 904.
11. Under the "sole sufficient condition" rule (see note 18), this sufficient
condition can also function as a necessary condition in some contexts; given
the procedural posture and disposition of the case-remand in accord with the
rule the court states, the court didn't need to commit itself regarding whether
the rule provided necessary and sufficient conditions for all cases. See Scott
Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics,and the Rational Force
of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARv. L. REV. 923, 1003-1117 (1996)
[hereinafter Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning].
12. The text of the RESTATEMENT makes it clear that this is an "if-and-onlyif rule connector," so there is no need to use the sole sufficient condition rule
here. Cf. note 11.
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A had no reason to know of any different meaning
attached by B and B had reason to know of the
different meaning attached by A.
What the Joyner court seems not to have realized" is that its
version of the "whose meaning prevails" rule is not identical to the
Restatement version. To explain the difference (in case it's not
obvious), I shall take a few moments to develop some special
terms.
1.

"Rule"and "Identity of rule-statements"

What does it mean to say that two versions of a rule are
identical? Instead of speaking of two "versions" of a rule, let us
refer to two (or more) rule-statements, where a rule-statement is
simply any statement of a rule. A rule is any proposition, possibly
internally complex, that has the logical form of the conditional
proposition If a then fl. A proposition is the abstract form of a
statement, bearing
to an instantiating statement the relation of
4
type to token.'
2. "Applicationof a Rule"
Though we need not, and I shall not, rely on the still
unsettled resources of "deontic" logic (the deductive system of
mandates and permissions), it will help to keep in mind that we
are concerned here with the setting in which a rule guides and
governs conduct, and where, roughly speaking, "facts" are
"plugged into" rules to produce outcomes under the rule. Less
roughly speaking, let us use the phrase application of a rule to
refer to the analysis of which, if any, of a rule's necessary or
sufficient conditions is satisfied (including the jointly sufficient or
jointly necessary conditions in an internally complex antecedent or
consequent) under the truth conditions (the "facts") of a given
possible world.
3.

"Sufficient-satisfied"and "Necessary-satisfied"

Let us say that a rule is sufficient-satisfiedwhen its sufficient
(including jointly sufficient) conditions are true. Thus, if P is true,
then the rule If P then Q is "sufficient-satisfied"; in monadic
predicate logic, the rule (x) (If Fx then Gx) (Forall x, If x is an F
then x is a G") is sufficient-satisfied when Fx is true for a given Fxi.
13. See note 8.
14. I help myself to metaphysically realist (i.e., non-nominalist) terms. I
presume that my scheme could be restated with no important loss of meaning
in purely nominalist terms, in the manner sketched by Goodman and
Scheffler, using the idea of "replicas" instead of types and tokens. See ISRAEL
SCHEFFLER, BEYOND THE LETrER: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO
AMBIGUITY, VAGUENESS, AND METAPHOR IN LANGUAGE (1979).
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Similarly,

a rule is necessary-satisfied when its necessary

(including jointly necessary) conditions are true. 5 Thus, if Q is

true, the rule If P then Q is "necessary-satisfied"; in monadic
predicate logic, the rule (x) (If Fx then Gx) is sufficient-satisfied
when Gx is true for some given Gx i .
4.

"Principleof the indiscernibilityof identical rules"

According to what I shall call the principle of the
indiscernibility of identical rules," two (or more) rule-statements
are statements of the same rule if and only if there is no possible
world in which the rules would have different applications. That
is, the rule-statements are statements of the same rule if and only
if there is no possible world in which their conditions of
satisfaction (sufficient-satisfaction or necessary-satisfaction) are
different.
5. Joyner's mistaken judgment about rule identity
Now back to the "whose meaning prevails" rules of Joyner
and the Restatement (Second). Are these rules identical? In
accord with the definitions offered above, this is better expressed
as the question whether the Joyner court's rule-statement and the
Restatement (Second)'s rule-statements
have
the same
applications in every possible world.
Clearly they do not.
Consider, for example, the situation in which party A actually
knows that B attached a different meaning to a disputed term,
while party B did not actually know, but did have reason to know,
that party A attached a different meaning to that term. (Suppose
A is a long time member of the baking trade while B is a recent
entrant; B does not know, but should know, that 'dozen' in a
contract for sale of baked goods actually means thirteen; A knows
that B does not know the special trade usage meaning of'dozen' in
a contract for the sale of "100 dozen doughnuts"; A actually knows
the different meaning attached to the term 'dozen' by B; B does not
actually know the different meaning attached by A and by other
members of the trade, but he has reason to know. 7 ) Under Joyner
15. Though awkward, the terms 'sufficient-satisfied'

and 'necessary-

satisfied' are less misleading than would be 'sufficiently-satisfied' and
'necessarily-satisfied'.
16. Of necessity (and I'm sure he would have agreed), we cannot all be

Leibniz. But, also of necessity, we can pay obeisance where we can.
17. If it is to be coherent, the RESTATEMENT rule also presupposes that
every person who actually knows also has reason to know the different
meaning assigned by the other party. Otherwise, in the hypothetical in the

text to this note, the rule could conceivably give a party like A a contract on
his meaning of dozen, since it would be possible for him actually to know
without also having reason to know, while under the same facts the rule could
give a party like B a contract on his terms, since he might conceivably have
reason to know without actually knowing. Fortunately, that every person who
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rule (2), neither A nor B is "innocent." A is not innocent, because
he had actual knowledge, while B is not innocent, because he had
reason to know. Thus, under Joyner Rule (1)," 8 neither party's
meaning prevails. Under the Restatement rule, however, party B's
meaning prevails, since a party can satisfy the (disjointly
sufficient) conditions for the rule either by having no actual
knowledge (of the other party's interpretation of the disputed
term) while the other party has actual knowledge, or by having no
reason to know while the other party does have reason to know.
In my "possible world" hypothetical, party B satisfies the first of
these disjuncts, and so, under the Restatement version of the rule,
his meaning prevails.19
How serious a logical muck-up is this? Not very, in the grand
scheme of the law, but neither is it insignificant. If the Joyner
court did intend to adopt into authoritative state law the exact
rule of the Restatement, lawyers and other judges in the state
would have different sources of guidance for developing the rule;
they could, for example, confidently look for persuasive authority
to decisions in other state courts that began with the same
"canonical" Restatement rule, just as there has been dialogue and
development about the meaning of the Restatement (Second)
version of § 90 among different state courts that have adopted § 90
into official state law.
More important, in articulating
authoritative law for its jurisdiction the appellate court in Joyner
seemed to be unaware" of the fact that its rule and the
Restatement rule were significantly different, and thus was
unaware of important differences in the policies and principles
that might justify adopting or rejecting one or the other version of
actually knows that p also has reason to know that p seems a sound and
relatively uncontroversial epistemic assumption.
18. The phrase in the text to this note 'Under Joyner rule (1)' means
interpreting rule 1 so that its antecedent provides not only a sufficient

condition for the consequent, but also as the sole sufficient condition. In some
interpretive contexts, a conditional proposition If a then /3, in which a is a
sufficient condition for P, also provides a necessary condition for P. The
interpretive contexts in which that is so are just those in which a is the only
sufficient condition for P. (In a very helpful discussion Rodes and Pospesel call

this the "sole sufficient condition rule.") See ROBERT E. RODES AND HOWARD
POSPESEL, PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS: PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS FOR

LEGAL ANALYSIS (1997). When this "sole sufficient condition" rule is satisfied,
If a then 83functions as the logical equivalent of a if and only if fl.

19. Note that, in a fit of interpretive charity, one must assume that under
the RESTATEMENT everyone who actually knows also has reason to know.
Otherwise, the rule would be incoherent, for it would allow the possibility that
party A could actually know while party B did not and that party A could at

the same time have no reason to know while party B could. In this
circumstance, both A's and B's (presumably inconsistent) meanings would
prevail. Fortunately, that everyone who actually knows also has reason to
know is not an epistemically unsound assumption.

20. See note 8.
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the rule. For example, the Restatement rule allows for "degrees of
innocence" while the Joyner version does not-under the
Restatement version, a person who only fails to know what the
other person thinks the meaning is when he had reason to know,
can still get a contract on his terms, while a person who actually
knows what the other person thinks the meaning is, but deals
with him without informing him of the different interpretations
(and so seems more culpably conniving) cannot get the contract on
his terms. The Restatement rule may for that reason be superior
on grounds of policy or principle, but in any event the Joyner
court's apparently inadvertent assumption that the two were
identical rule-statements buries this important question.
However important or unimportant is Joyner's logical misstep, it
does provide an excellent example of the errors that can come of
inattentiveness and insufficient mastery of deductive logical
structure.
B. Interpretationsof U.C.C. § 2-207
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207 and the Comments thereto
are a trove of traps for the logically unwary. The provision deals
with offer and acceptance in certain commercial settings, and was
adopted to modify the previously prevailing "mirror image" and
"last shot" rules of most common law jurisdictions.2 1 I shall call
attention to two "traps for the logically unwary" sprung by this
provision. The first was sprung on its drafter. Its text states in
full:
2-207(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time
operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to
or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different
terms.
Restated in a form that makes the rule more logically
perspicuous, where
A
B

= there's a definite and seasonable
= there's a written confirmation

expression of acceptance
which is sent within a

reasonable time
the expression of acceptance or the written
operates as an acceptance
D = the expression of acceptance or the written
states terms additional to or different from
or agreed upon
E = acceptance is expressly made conditional
C

confirmation
confirmation
those offered
on assent to

21. JAMES J. WHITE AND ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE 30-31 (5th ed. 2000).
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additional or different terms
-

the rule is

(4) (If (A or B) then C, even though D) unless E.
As several commentators have noted,22 the problem here is
that when B is true, there has by hypothesis already been an offer
and acceptance prior to the sending of the written confirmation. It
is therefore too late for the "expression of acceptance or the
written confirmation" to "operate as an acceptance", i.e., too late
for C to be true. It is also too late for "acceptance to be expressly
made conditional on assent to additional or different terms," i.e.,
too late for E to be true.2" In a case involving a written
"confirmation" that is inconsistent with the terms of a prior oral
agreement, there is really no role for an inquiry into whether C or
E is true, and the court should move directly to analysis under 2207(2).24
The drafter's lapse in attentiveness to deductive structure is
clearly much more serious than in the Joyner case, if only because
this was intended to be, and turned out to be, a uniform rule for all
state jurisdictions that brought about a major change in then
existing common law rules of offer and acceptance. Moreover, it is
only one of several logical opacities in this rule and its attending
Official Comments (others include the-intentional?--omission of
the term 'additional' in the move from 2-207(1) to 2-207(2), and its
miraculous resuscitation in Official Comment 3)25 It is hard to
avoid the conclusion that the confusions that surrounded the
22. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 298-300 (2d ed.
1998).
23. Id. at 306-307.
24. See, e.g., Air Products and Chem. Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 206
N.W.2d 414 (Wis. 1973).
25. For the occurrence of 'different or additional terms' in 2-207(1), see the
text at page 17. 2-207(2) and Official Comment 3 read as follows:
2-207(2): The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of
the contract unless:
(a) The offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) They materially alter it; or
(c) Notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
OFFICIAL COMMENT 3: Whether or not additional or different terms will
become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection
(2). If they are such as materially to alter the original bargain, they will
not be included unless expressly agreed to by the other party. If,
however, they are terms which would not so change the bargain they
will be incorporated unless notice of objection to them has already been
given or is given within a reasonable time.
(Emphases added.)
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application of 2-207 from its first applications were in no small
measure created by the drafter's insufficient logical attentiveness
to deductive structure. The faults of inattention to deductive
structure and logical form have not rested solely with the drafter
of 2-207. Opinions in several jurisdictions have either committed
a rather elementary deductive fallacy, or at least rather casually
misunderstood a basic feature of deductive inference, as I shall
now describe.
Trans-Aire International" involved, among other issues, a
dispute between commercial merchants about whether an
"additional term"-an indemnification provision-that appeared in
a "written confirmation" but not in the parties' oral agreement was
binding on the recipient of that confirmation. Since there had
already been an oral agreement, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals properly focused its analysis on the application of U.C.C.
2-207(2).27 The relevant portion of the court's analysis is worth
quoting in full:
Section 2-207 of the Illinois Commercial Code provides that
additional terms included in a written confirmation "are to be
construed as proposals for addition to the contract" and will not
become part of the contract if "they materially alter it." See
Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 26, para. 2- 207(2) (Smith-Hurd 1963); McCarty v.
Verson Allsteel Press Co., 89 Mll.App.3d 498, 411 N.E.2d 936, 44
Ill.Dec. 570 (1980). A term is consideredto be a material alteration
if its inclusion would "result in surprise or hardship if incorporated
without express awareness by the other party." Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 26,
para.2-207 Comment 4 (Smith-Hurd 1963); Clifford-Jacobs Forging
Co. v. Capital Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 107 IM.App.3d 29, 32, 437 N.E.2d
22, 24, 62 Ill.Dec. 785, 787 (1982); see also Chicago Litho Plate
Graining Co. v. Allstate Can Co., 838 F.2d 927, 931 (7th Cir.
1988).... As we stated above, Comment 4 to section 2-207 defines a
material alteration as one which would "result in surprise or
hardship if incorporated without the express awareness" of the
nonassenting party. IMl.Ann.Stat. ch. 26, para. 2-207 Comment 4
Under this language, an
(Smith-Hurd 1963) (emphasis added) ....
additional term may be characterized as a material alteration if it
either "surprises"the nonassenting party or if its inclusion, without
an express meeting of the minds, would impose an unreasonable
28
"hardship"upon the nonassentingparty.
Of particular interest here is the court's analysis of the rule for
"material alteration." As the court correctly states, under 2207(2), additional terms included in a written confirmation "are to

26. Trans-Aire International v. Northern Adhesive Co. Inc., 882 F.2d 1254
(7th Cir. 1989).
27. Regarding the move from 2-207(1) into 2-207(2) in cases involving
different or additional terms in written confirmations, see notes 23 and 24.
For the full text of § 2-207, see note 25.
28. 882 F.2d at 1260-61 (emphases added).
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be construed as proposals for addition to the contract" and will not
become part of the contract if "they materially alter it."29 So the

question for the court became, does an indemnification provision
that appears as an "additional term" in a written confirmation
"materially alter" the agreement that it purported to confirm? The
court thus needed a rule to help guide it about what the sufficient
or necessary conditions of "material alteration" were. The text of
2-207 itself says nothing about that question, but as it happened,
Official Comment 4, adopted, in accord with the usual practice of
states adopting the UCC, as part of the Illinois Code,80 did
specifically mention the material alteration provision, and even
seemed to suggest a rule governing its application. According to
Official Comment 4 (quoted here in full),
Examples of typical clauses which would normally "materially alter"
the contract and so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated
without express awareness by the other party are: a clause negating
such standard warranties as that of merchantability or fitness for a
particular purpose in circumstances in which either warranty
normally attaches; a clause requiring a guaranty of 90% or 100%
deliveries in a case such as a contract by cannery, where the usage
of the trade allows greater quantity leeways; a clause reserving to
the seller the power to cancel upon the buyer's failure to meet any
invoice when due; a clause requiring that complaints be made in a
time materially shorter than customary or reasonable. 31
Citing Comment 4, the Trans-Aire court articulated the following
rule for "material alteration": A term is considered to be a material
alteration if its inclusion would "result in surprise or hardship if
incorporated without express awareness by the other party." Put
in a form that makes its rule structure a bit clearer, the rule for
material alteration stated and endorsed by the court is this:
(5) If the term's incorporation would result in surprise
or hardship if the term is incorporated without
express awareness by the other party, then the
term is a material alteration.
which is just another way of expressing a proposition of the logical
form:
(6) If (the term is incorporated without express
awareness by the other party and the term's
incorporation would result in surprise or
hardship), then the term is a material alteration.

29. 882 F.2d at 1260. See also note 25.
30. See text at note 28.
31. IL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-207 cmt. 4 (Smith-Hurd 1963).
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Put more abstractly still, we can use simple propositional calculus
(it will serve here well enough) to present the abstract logical form
of this rule.
Let 'p' name the proposition 'the term is incorporated without
express awareness by the other party.'
Let 'q' name the proposition 'the term's incorporation would result
in surprise or hardship.'
Let 'r' name the proposition 'the term is a material alteration.'
With these propositional abbreviations, rule (5) becomes:
(7) If (if p then q) then r.
which in turn logically implies (but is not equivalent to):
(8) If (p and q) then r.
The problem here is that Official Comment 4 certainly does
not literally state rule (5) (nor the synonymous expression of the
rule in (7), which itself implies (8)), nor does it give its readers any
sufficient reason to read its assertion about material alteration as
some kind of non-literal assertion or underwriting of rule (5) (or
(7) or (8)). Instead, Official Comment 4 offers several examples of
terms that would "materially alter" an agreement, and asserts a
general consequence of a materially altering clause, namely, that
its inclusion in a contract "would result in surprise or hardship if
the term is incorporated without express awareness by the other
party." If any rule for "material alteration" emerges from Official
Comment 4, it is not Trans-Aire's rule (5) (or (7) or (8)), but is
instead some version of
(9) If the term is a material alteration, then the term's
incorporation would result in surprise or
hardship if the term is incorporated without
express awareness by the other party.
i.e. using the propositional abbreviations offered above,
(10) If r then (if p then q)
which both logically implies and is logically equivalent to:
(11) If (r and p) then q)
Putting my point here in its least charitable form, the court may
be said to have fallaciously, at least under standard rules of
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propositional calculus, inferred from a proposition of the form If a

then 83 (this is the abstract logical form of proposition (7),
substituting 'a' for (7)'s antecedent 'if p then q' and 'P' for its
consequent 'r') a proposition of the form If /8 then a (this is the
abstract logical form of proposition (10), again substituting 'a' for
'if p then q' and '1' for 'r')). 2 To put the point more charitably: the
court may be said to have misunderstood and misinterpreted the
underlying formal rule that is informally expressed in Comment
4.8

3

Not only is there no sufficient reason for the Trans-Aire
court's reading of Official Comment 4 in the literal text of Official
Comment 4, but the court's misconstrual, resulting in its
endorsement of Rule (5), is also seriously questionable on policy
grounds.
Surely, for example, there are many commercial
communities in which the inclusion of a term in the contract of a
buyer or seller is very widely expected and accepted. Suppose that
such a term is included as an "additional term" in a written
confirmation, and that its inclusion would "surprise" the other
party even though that party should not reasonably be surprised,
i.e., even though that party's surprise is unreasonable. Under the
Trans-Aire version of the rule, even the most abysmally
unreasonably ignorant party is entitled to exclude from an
agreement a term that every reasonable member of the trade
would have expected to be in the contract. But the Trans-Aire
court thought that rule (5) was either endorsed or required by the
text of Official Comment 4 and so closed itself off to the possibility
that the rule for material alteration it stated might well be
inadequate on policy grounds. Here, as in Joyner, a court's
misunderstanding of details of deductive structure and inference
very likely led it to overlook the serious questions of policy and
principle raised by the version of the rule the court articulated,
endorsed, and applied.
Having presented evidence of the kinds of mistakes courts
can make with deductive form, I turn now in earnest to my

32. In some interpretive contexts, a conditional proposition of the form If a
then f6 can be correctly interpreted as logically equivalent to a if and only if

A-namely, those contexts in which we may conclude that a is the sole
sufficient condition for P, i.e., that there is no other conditional proposition in
which some proposition other than a (or some proposition synonymous with a)
is an antecedent for P as consequent. See note 18 (on "sole sufficient
condition" rule of logic). The text of Comment 4 gives us no reason to believe
that the Comment's authors believed that the only way a party to a contract
could suffer "surprise or hardship" was when a "materially altering" term was
added to the contract without the party's express awareness.
33. This is a more "charitable" reading, if-as seems right to me for most
cases-it is a worse misjudgment to misinterpret an informal proposition into
its more formal expression than it is to draw a fallacious inference from
something already expressed in a relatively formal way..
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principal focus:
the Holmes-Dewey contention that legal
argument never has deductive structure. If that claim is correct,
then the apparent flaws in the Joyner and Trans-Aire courts'
analyses actually might not be flawed at all. But they are, and the
Dewey-Holmes argument is itself demonstrably flawed as well.
II. HOLMES, DEWEY, AND "DEFEASIBILITY ANTI-DEDUCTMISM"
The core view to which I shall refer as "anti-deductivism"
about legal argument is expressed in concise quotable form by
Holmes and in more philosophically detailed form by John Dewey
and Felix Cohen. It consists of four closely related claims:
(12) The concepts used in empirically applicable legal
rules (e.g., 'contract') never come into legal
argument with all their necessary and sufficient
conditions built in.
There are two versions of the next claim, one broader (13), one
narrower (14).
(13) Given that (12) is true, judges always change the
logical criteria (the necessary or sufficient
conditions) of those concepts in
light of
immediate social and political circumstance in
the very act of applying the legal rules to
particular cases.
(14) Given that (12) is true, judges sometimes change
the logical criteria (the necessary or sufficient
conditions) of those concepts in
light of
immediate social and political circumstance in
the very act of applying the legal rules to
particular cases
(15) All legal arguments are defeasible: no matter how
firmly warranted a given conclusion of a legal
argument may seem on the basis of one set of
premises, the addition of new premises (e.g., new
truths about social or political circumstance) can
undermine that conclusion.
(16) Because (by definition) no defeasible argument
can be deductively valid, a consequence of (13) is
that no legal argumentsare deductively valid.
For convenience, albeit certainly not for elegance, I shall refer
to this congeries of closely related positions about the non-
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deductive character of legal argument as "defeasibility antideductivism." My limited brief in this article is to discuss
defeasibility anti-deductivism in four steps.
First I offer a very brief statement of the principal legal
realist sources of this version of anti-deductivism.
Second I show that, in the strict version of the claim we find
in John Dewey's article Logical Method and the Law,

4

the

claim both leads its proponents into a logical dilemma and is
undermined by clear counterexamples.
Third I offer an alternative view of the way in which legal
rules and concepts evolve over time and show that this
alternative view, which happily concedes the truth of claims
(12) and (14) while also denying claims (13), (15), and (16), is
both metaphysically and logically possible.
Fourth I argue that this alternative view is fully consistent
with an empiricist view of the source of legal rules and legal
concepts (namely, that they arise from the "positive" acts of
legislative, judicial, administrative,
or other legal
authorities).
A. Classicstatements of defeasibility anti-deductivism
Many Legal Realists offered virtually unqualified rejections of
the view that legal interpretation involves deduction in any
significant way. For example, in his lectures on the common law
Holmes declared:
The object of this book is to present a general view of the Common
Law. To accomplish that task, other tools are needed besides logic.
It is something to show that the consistency of a system requires a
particular result, but it is not all. The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it
contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of
mathematics.35

34. 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924).
35. OLrVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963) (1881). See also Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 1, at 466
("[Tihe logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for
repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is an illusion,

20001

On the Possibilityof Necessity in Legal Argument

Legal realist philosopher Felix Cohen sounded this same theme:
If the doctrine of stare decisis means anything, and one can hardly
maintain the contrary despite the infelicitous formulations which
have been given to the doctrine, the consistency which it demands
cannot be a logical consistency. The consistency in question is more
akin to that quality of dough which is necessary for the fixing of a
durable shape. Decisions are fluid until they are given "morals." It
is often important to conserve with new obeisance the morals which
lawyers and laymen have read into past decisions and in reliance
upon which they have acted. We do not deny that importance when
we recognize that with equal logical justification lawyers and
laymen might have attached other morals to the old cases had their
habits of legal classification or their general social premises been
different.36
Generations of post-Holmesian legal academics and their
students (many of whom have gone on to become lawyers and
judges) have acquired the view, almost as an intellectual knee-jerk
reflex, that deductive logic has very little useful role to play in
legal argument. After all, no post- Holmesian post-realist denies
that a very great part of the law involves argument. But if "the
life of the law" is not logic but at the same time does inescapably
involve a great deal of argument, then mustn't we conclude that
"logic" has very little to do with, or anyway little of significance to
do with legal argument?
John Dewey expresses a more
philosophically tight version of this view.
Take the case of Socrates being tried before the Athenian citizens,
and the thinking which had to be done to reach a decision.
Certainly the issue was not whether Socrates was mortal; the point
was whether this mortality would or should occur at a specified date
and in a specified way. Now that is just what does not and cannot
follow from a general principle or a major premise. Again to quote
Justice Holmes, "General propositions do not decide concrete cases."
No concrete proposition, that is to say one with material dated in
time and placed in space, follows from any general statements or
from any connection between them.37
To begin a critical assessment of this Holmes-Dewey-CohenLegal Realist view--"defeasibility anti-deductivism"-I shall
explain two logical problems with the thesis. This seems a fair
argumentative move. Although Dewey does deny that legal
argument relies on deductive logic in applying rules to "concrete

and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment
as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often
an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and
nerve of the whole proceeding.")
36. Felix S. Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 Yale L.J. 201,
216-17 (1931).
37. Dewey, supra note 34, at 22.
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facts," he does not deny that he himself is trying to take advantage
of the resources of deductive logic in supporting his claim. Indeed,
within the quotation above he offers a rule: no concrete
proposition... follows deductively from any general statements or
from any connection between them. This rule seems best taken as
a premise in a putatively valid deductive argument, for Dewey
clearly wants the vast power of universal generalization to make
his anti-deductivist point. Yet in this particular case his own use
of deductive inference to support his contention about the
defeasibility of legal argument leads him into at least two
technical problems. The claim impales him on the horns of a
dilemma and is also prey to a clear counter-example.
B. A dilemma for the defeasibility anti-deductivist
Let's again focus on Dewey's central anti-deductivist claim:
(17) No concrete proposition, that is to say one with
material dated in time and placed in space,
follows deductively from any general statements
or from any connection between them.
Note that in restating (17) I have added to Dewey's exact
quote the adverb deductively.
That is clearly the kind of
"following" he and Holmes are out to deny-Dewey would not deny
that a concrete proposition38 "follows from" general propositions in
some non-deductive way, perhaps as a matter of analogy or even
as a matter of Dewey's own "experimental logic."39 I shall argue
that Dewey's claim (17) "proves too much," and therefore proves
not much at all. Consider these two arguments:
ARGUMENT I
(18) The Athenian state should execute within a year of
trial any person convicted of disbelieving the
official gods of the state.
(19) Socrates was convicted of disbelieving the official

38. There is no textual evidence to suggest that Dewey here distinguished
'statements" and "propositions," though logicians sometimes offer stipulate
distinctions between these terms (e.g., proposition is abstract type and
statement is context-bound token).
39. See Dewey, supra note 34, at 22 ("If we trust to an experimental logic,

we find general principles emerge as statements of generic ways in which it
has been found helpful to treat concrete cases. The real force of the
proposition that all men are mortal is found in the expectancy tables of
insurance companies, which with their accompanying rates show how it is

prudent and socially useful to deal with human mortality.")
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gods of the state in Athens in 399 BC
Therefore,
(20) The Athenian state should execute Socrates within
a year of 399 BC
ARGUMENT II

(17) No concrete proposition, that is to say one with
material dated in time and placed in space,
follows deductively from any general statements
or from any connection between them.
(21) Proposition (20) contains material dated in time
and placed in space.
(22) Proposition (20) does not follow deductively from
propositions (18) and (19).
(23) If no concrete proposition follows deductively
from any general proposition(s) or from any
connection between them, then no concrete
proposition deductively follows from some
general proposition(s) or from some connection
between them at any time or at any place.
Therefore,
(24) Proposition (20) does not follow deductively from
propositions (18) and (19) in Athens in 399 BC.
Before getting to the actual dilemma that these two
arguments create for Dewey's endorsement of proposition (17), I
offer two important observations. The first is simply that
proposition (24) surely seems to be a "concrete" proposition in
Dewey's sense, since is seems to be one "dated in time and placed
in space." My second observation concerns proposition (23) and is
a bit more complex. Proposition (23) says that if there does not
exist a concrete proposition that follows deductively from some
general proposition(s) or from some connection between, then
there does not exist a concrete proposition that follows deductively
from some general proposition(s) or from some connection between
them at any time or at any place. ° Although it may not be

40. We can express the context of proposition (23) more formally:
Let predicate F stand for is a concrete proposition that follows
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obvious, (23) really is just a logical consequence of the definition of
the phrase "deductively valid." To say that one proposition a does
follow deductively-i.e., follows by a valid deductive inferencefrom another proposition 3 is to say that there is no possible world
(no consistent systematic assignment of truth values to the
propositions) in which a is true and P is false. To say that a
proposition a does not follow deductively-i.e., does not follow by a
valid deductive inference-from another proposition 0 is to say
that there is some possible world in which a is true and P is false.
Thus if a does not follow by a valid deductive inference from 3, it
does not do so in any possible world. I can state the point as a
meta-logical "theorem" of deductive inference, a theorem that
entails (23):
(25) a follows by a valid deductive inference from P in
some possible world only if a follows by a valid
deductive inference from 1 in every possible
world.
What these logical convolutions show is that, as a matter of logical
theory and structure, the claim that a does not follow by a valid
deductive inference from proposition 1 entails the claim that there
is no possible world in which a follows by a valid deductive
inference from 1. And since the actual world is a possible world, a
does not follow by a valid deductive inference from 13in that actual
world either-it follows, in fact, at no time and in no place in the
actual world or in any other possible world (including the possible
world of 399 BC Athens).
One further point about proposition (23). Proposition (23)
does in some sense "generalize" about times and places-if there
exists no concrete proposition that follows deductively from any
general proposition, then (here is the generalization) for any time
or any place one considers, there will exist no concrete proposition
that follows deductively from a general proposition at that time or
at that place. Although in this way (23) generalizes, it is probably
not best understood as the kind of generalization to which Dewey

deductively from
connection between
Let predicate G stand
deductively from
connection between
Then proposition (23) says each
equivalent):

some general proposition(s) or from some
them
for is a concrete proposition that follows
some general proposition(s) or from some
them at some time or at some place.
of the following (they are all logically

No F are G
If anything is an F then it is not a G [i.e., (x) (Fx n - Gx)]
There does not exist anything that is both an F and a G [i.e., - (3x)

(Fx & Gx)]
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refers when he mentions "general statements." ' The paradigm
case for a "general statement" in Dewey's sense, as he makes quite
clear, is the "major premise" of a syllogism, like
(26) All men are mortal.

2

By contrast, a proposition like (23) is best understood as the
assertion of a logical consequence of a definition-it is more like
(27) If there does not exist a bachelor that is a married
man, then there does not exist a bachelor that has
gone
through a legally
binding marriage
ceremony.
than it is like (26). Relying on this point about (23) might make
it easier for some readers to see how Dewey gets caught in a
dilemma, but I do not really need it, and will show that the
dilemma still works even if (23) is a "general statement" in
Dewey's sense.
-

On then, to the next step in constructing the dilemma for
Dewey. One would be inclined to think that, in Argument II,
above, (24) follows deductively from (17), (21), (22), and (23), 4" in
just the same way that
(28) Socrates is mortal.
follows deductively from
(26) All men are mortal.
And
41. See note 38 on interchangeability of the term 'statement' and the term
'proposition.'
42. See infra note 43.

43. There is some slight (but I think only very slight) unclarity in Dewey's
assertion that "No concrete proposition, that is to say one with material dated
in time and placed in space, follows from any general statements or from any
connection between them." Dewey, supra note 34, at 22. The "them" here
must refer to a connection between a concrete proposition, on the one hand,
and a general proposition, on the other, and so Dewey must be referring to
standard syllogistic inferences like that of (28) from (26) and (29)-as the
context in which he offers this assertion strongly suggests:
Take the case of Socrates being tried before the Athenian citizens, and
the thinking which had to be done to reach a decision. Certainly the
issue was not whether Socrates was mortal; the point was whether this
mortality would or should occur at a specified date and in a specified

way.
Dewey, supra note 34, at 22.
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(29) Socrates is a man.
Does Dewey's claim, summarized in proposition (17), commit him
to denying that (24) follows deductively from (17), (21), (22), and
(23)? It is by considering this question that we can see how Dewey
is caught on the horns of a dilemma:
First horn: Suppose Dewey's proposition (17) does commit him to
denying that (24) follows deductively from (17), (21), (22), and (23).
If (24) does not follow deductively from (17), (21), (22), and (23),
then the inference from (17), (21), (22), and (23), is (by definition)
defeasible in particularcircumstances, and this amounts to one of
two claims, both of which undermine the force of Dewey's claim
(17). I consider both of these undermining claims.
If (24) does not follow deductively from (17), (21), (22), and
(23), then the inference from (17), (21), (22), and (23), is (by
definition) defeasible in particular circumstances, and
(a) this amounts to the claim that (17) is not a true
universal generalization. But if (17) is not a true
universal generalization, then under some circumstances
a proposition like (20) could follow deductively from
propositions like (18) and (19) - i.e. that there are some
legal rules that are true universal generalizations. But
this is exactly what Dewey wants to deny in (17), or
(b) this amounts to the claim that that the
conjunction of (17) and (23) is not a true universal
generalization." (We consider this option just in case
proposition (23) is to be regarded as the kind of "general
statement" to which Dewey refers in (17). For reasons
offered above, proposition (23) is best thought of not as a
"general statement" in Dewey's sense, but he is in a
dilemma either way.) Suppose arguendo that proposition
(23) is a "general statement" in Dewey's sense. Even so,
it is also just a direct result of basic definitions in the
theory of valid deductive inference (like the direct result
of the definition of 'bachelor' in proposition (27)). To
deny that (23) is a true universal generalization (if it is a
44. An argument is defeasible just when the addition of new premises to an
existing set of premises undermines the degree of warrant the truth of the
premises gives to the truth of the conclusion. Apart from some special "nonmonotonic" deductive systems (whose structure is still very much debated by
logicians and artificial intelligence theorists), valid deductive inferences, of the
sort Dewey had in mind, are not defeasible.
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generalization at all) would require substantial revision
in the structure of predicate logic, which presumably
Dewey does not intend to make. So what prevents the
conjunction of (17) and (23) from being a true universal
generalization is not (23), but is instead (17): If(24) does
not follow deductively from (17), (21), (22), and (23), then
(17) is not a true universal generalization. But, as seen
in considering option (a), above, this in turn means that
under some circumstances a proposition like (20) could
follow deductively from propositions like (18) and (19) i.e. that there are some legal rules that are true universal
generalizations.
Second horn: Suppose Dewey's proposition (17) does not commit
him to denying that (24) follows deductively from (17), (21), (22),
and (23). If Dewey allows that (24) does follow deductively from
(17), (21), (22), and (23), then here again it seems that (17) is not a
true universal generalization, and thus, that under some
circumstances a proposition like (20) could follow deductively from
propositions like (18) and (19).
Bottom line: From a logical point of view-a point of view Dewey
himself seems to adopt in articulating and defending proposition
(17)-Dewey's own Holmesian assertion about the limits of
deduction as applied to concrete cases undermines itself.
C. A counter-example to the defeasibility anti-deductivist claim
There is another, more straightforward logical method one
can use to undermine the force of Dewey's assertion (17). This is
the simple method, adored by lawyers and judges and law
professors (and little statesmen and philosophers and divines), of
adducing a counterexample." Let "I" be the predicate, "is identical
to itself at all times and in all places." Then, from the proposition
(30) Everything is identical to itself at all times and in
all places.
from this one may infer, in a valid deductive inference,
(31) Caesar was identical to himself in Rome on the
Ides of March.6
45. Thanks to Robert Nozick for helpful discussion on this point.
46. Of course, that (31) is deductively inferable from (30) is not a special
feature of the identity predicate I've constructed. Rather, that inference is
just an instance of the rule of predicate calculus that licenses the inference
from a universally generalizing predication to a predication of some

individual.
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Again, (31) seems paradigmatically "dated in time and placed in
space," and it also seems to follow in a swift and clean deductive
inference from (30). This is just a plain old-fashioned
counterexample to Dewey's assertion (17). QED.
For some, the rigor of logic is too much like the rigor of
mortis, and the foregoing discussion may leave those readers cold.
The discussion might seem like so many technical tricks that
really don't join issue with the important point that Holmes,
Dewey, and others advanced. I don't see it this way-he who lives
by logic.... Dewey's anti-deductivist claim lives by-gets its
strength from-its force as a putatively true universal
generalization about the logical relations between "concrete" and
"general" propositions. Fortunately, there is another way to join
issue with Dewey (Holmes, et al.), one that relies not on technical
details about logical relations but instead on some fundamental
features of the way language is used in context-including the
context of legal argument. To join issue in this way, I shall
present and defend a "punctuated deductive equilibrium" model of
change in legal rules. I shall also suggest why that model can
plausibly provide a better explanation of the phenomena of legal
argument than does the Holmes-Dewey defeasibility model.
(Again, my quite limited objective in this article is only to show
the plausibility of the model I present.)
D. A "punctuateddeductive equilibrium"model of the evolution of
legal rules
What I shall refer to as the "punctuated deductive
equilibrium" model provides an explanation of evolution in legal
rules-that is, of the way in which legal rules change over time
within a jurisdiction. It is the not plausibly deniable fact of
evolution in legal rules in specific jurisdictions that led Holmes
and Dewey and other leading realist figures to conclude that legal
argument is both defeasible and, perforce, not deductive (claims
(15) and (16)). 47 On the "pragmatist" view of the defeasibility antideductivist, legal rules are in a more or less constant state of flux,
as judges, in light of ever changing social and political
circumstance-and with greater or lesser intellectual and political
honesty-adjust the rules in the very process of applying them.48
47. See page 23.
48. This "realist" view of the evolution of legal rules is concisely articulated

by Edward Levi (himself not a full blooded legal realist, but a sometime fellow
traveler):

[I]t cannot be said that the legal process is the application of known
rules to diverse facts .... The kind of reasoning involved in the legal
process is one in which the classification changes as the classification is
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In this section I want to present another model of legal-rule
evolution, and show that the model is logically (and perforce
metaphysically) possible. To be sure, mere logical possibility-the
possibility of the truth of all of the model's propositions in some
one possible world-is a weak criterion. I believe, but I shall leave
for elsewhere, the important additional demonstration that this
model is not only possible, but that it is plausible, and fully
consistent with what we know about our actual world (including of
course facts about legal systems and the nature or legal
argument), and offers the best explanation of those actual facts
about this world and the legal arguments constructed within it.
This is of course a tall order. Here I chew a much smaller
mouthful, and begin that larger intellectual mastication by
providing a logically possible explanatory model of legal argument
that can compete with the "constant flux" model defended by
Dewey and other like-minded "defeasibility anti-deductivists."
Let us recall that by 'rule' I mean a proposition, possibly
internally complex, whose logical structure is reflected in a
conditional proposition of the form If a then #1 (in propositional
logic) or For all 4 if 8 is a 0 then 5 is a O(in first order predicate
logic). 9 The punctuated deductive equilibrium model is perhaps
most easily explained with some simple heuristic examples. I
begin with a purely abstract example just to display the basic
structure of the model. I then follow with examples that are
perhaps more accessible, including one example of change in legal
rules in a Supreme Court decision.
First the abstract hypothetical example. Consider a regime of
rules in which the following occurs. At time T, it is established
that
(32) All F are G
("all things that are F are G") is true. At time T,, it is established
that
(33) Some F are H
and
(34) No H is G
("some things that are F are H" and "no things that are H are G")
are both true. (32), (33), and (34) form an inconsistent set of

made. The rules change as the rules are applied.
E. LEVI, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3-4 (1949).

49. See page 14.
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propositions, that is, there is no possible world in which all three
propositions are true. We have at least three explanatory options
if we were to try to explain what has happened in the transition
from time T1 to time T2.
Option 1: We say that, in light of the fact that (33) and (34) came
to be established as truths, we should revise (32) in the following
way. We should give up the view held at time T1 that (32) was true
(was a true universal generalization about all members of the F
category), and, in light of the new information provided by (33),
and (34), say that actually, even at time T, only a logically weaker
version of (32) was true, namely,
(35) Some F are G
("some things that are F are also G").
Option 2: We say that, in light of the fact that (33) and (34) came
to be established as truths, we should revise (32) in the following
way. We should say that, at time T2, what is true is the logically
narrowerproposition
(36) All F that are not also H are G
("all things that are F and are not also H are G'). A crucial
difference in Option 2 is that we come to hold (36) true without
also saying that (32) was not true at time T 1. Instead, we allow
that (32) was true at time T1 and that (36) is true at time T 2.
Option 3: We say that all three propositions, (32), (33), and (34),
are true at time T2 (we are here not concerned about time T1). This
means that our total set of propositions is inconsistent (there is no
possible world in which all three propositions are true), which
among other things means that every (well formed) proposition
follows validly from the conjunction of (32), (33), and (34)including two contradictory propositions. 5°
Let's look at these three basic options for explaining rule
change with a less abstract example. At some time within the

50. Thus for example we can validly infer that any individual x, which is
both an F and H, is a G (by virtue of (32)) and that any individual x, which is
both an F and H, is not a G (by virtue of (33) and (34)). Note that the reason
for which deductively valid inferences are indefeasible is that even when a
premise is added to a previously existing set of premises that is inconsistent
with that previous set of premises, no valid inference from the previous set of
premises can be undermined, simply because the new, internally inconsistent
set of premises permits a valid inference of every conclusion. This is what is

happening, from a logical point of view, in Option 3.
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past two decades, the National Basketball Association ("NBA")
adopted a new rule for the scoring of "field goals." A field goal is
an in-bounds shot made during regular play (a shot is made when
the ball goes through the hoop), not during time-out, not during
time for foul shots, etc. Before the adoption of the new rule, every
field goal was worth exactly two points. Under the new rule, a
field goal shot from a certain specified perimeter distance beyond
the basket is worth exactly three points. The perimeter area is
marked by a clearly visible line on the court (call this the "three
point boundary"), so that players and spectators and referees can
fairly easily determine which shots were taken from beyond the
perimeter (though of course there would be some "vague shots,"
namely, those shots in which is was not clear whether the player
was outside of the perimeter). Let us call time T1 the time before
this new rule was adopted, i.e., the time at which this proposition
was true in the "jurisdiction" of the NBA:
(37) All field goals are to be scored at exactly 2 points.
Let us refer to time T 2 as the time after which the new rule was
adopted, i.e., the time at which this proposition was true in the
"jurisdiction" of the NBA:
(38) All field goals shot from beyond the three point
boundary are to be scored at exactly 3 points.
Once again, there are at least three options for explaining the
change in rules from T1 to T 2.
Option 1: We say that, in light of the fact that (38) came to be
established as a truth in the NBA regime, we should revise (37).
We should give up the view held at time T, that (37) was true (that
is, that it was a true universal generalization about the scoring
value of all field goals), and, in light of the new information
provided by (38), say that actually, even at time T1 , only a logically
weaker version of (37) was true, namely,
(39) Some field goals are to be scored at exactly 2
points.
Option 2: We say that, in light of the fact that (38) came to be
established as true in the NBA regime, we should revise (37) in
the following way. We should say that, at time T,, what is true is
the logically narrower proposition:
(40) All field goals shot from within the three point
boundary are to be scored at exactly 2 points, and
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all field goals shot from beyond the three point
boundary are to be scored at exactly 3 points.
Once again, a critical difference in Option 2 is that we come to
hold (40) true without also saying that (37) was not true at time T.
Instead, we allow that (37) was true at time Ti and that (40) is
true at time T,.
Option 3: We say that both propositions are true at time T, (we
are here not concerned about time T,). This again would mean
that our total set of propositions is inconsistent, and would allow
for one and the same shot (one taken from beyond the three point
boundary) to be scored at exactly three points and also to be scored
at exactly two points.
Here's the payoff of these two examples. If applied to the
NBA example, the Holmes-Dewey defeasibility theses (expressed
as (15) and (16) above)"' is committed to Option 1 as an
explanation of the change in rules, while the deductive punctuated
equilibrium model is committed to Option 2. Notice that, as a
matter of educated intuition, the Holmes-Dewey option seems
rather unpromising as an explanation of the change in the NBA
rules. Should we really say that now (our current period is within
time T.) the three-point rule (40) is defeasible, simply because the
authorized NBA rule makers might modify it some time in the
future? That is, must we deny that we can deduce that any
particular shot taken from beyond the three point boundary is
worth exactly three points?
E. Punctuated deductive equilibrium as a logical and
metaphysicalpossibility
I want now to highlight one feature of the deductive
punctuated equilibrium model that I have suggested but not
emphasized in the previous section. Consider a range of time
periods, T,, T, T 3...
T., over which the deductively applicable
"official" rules of some rule system (rules whose role as part of the
system of rules is determined by a "rule of recognition"") change.
Consider also the total set of deductively applicable official rules
that are in force at some time or other, Ti, within the range T, T 2,

T

.

..

T--call this total set of rules '.

Under the deductive

punctuated equilibrium model of rule change, even when A
contains logically inconsistentofficially adopted rules (rules whose
application yields deductively inconsistent propositions "), it is still

51. See discussion supra p. 23.
52. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, chs. 5 and 6 (2d ed. 1994) See
also text accompanying note 55.

53. On the concept of "application" of a rule, see section A(1).
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logically possible (and perforce metaphysically possible) for the
rules officially adopted at some particular time period T to be both
deductively applicable and internally consistent.
Moreover,
putting this point in Dewey's terms, it is logically possible for the
rules officially adopted at some time period T to yield both
deductively valid inferences of concrete propositions from general
ones and to be internally consistent. This, for example, is the
situation with the change in rules from times T1 to T2 in the NBA
"3-point" example in the previous section. There is thus nothing
logically impossible asserted or presupposed or implied by the
model of deductive punctuated equilibrium per se, for the simple
reason that there is no general logical problem with creating a set
of constitutive rules for a game like basketball or chess, and then
changing that set of constitutive rules. The deductive punctuated
equilibrium model of rule change simply says that the rules in the
game at time T, can be deductively applicable at that time even
when they are inconsistent with the rules of the "evolved" game at
time T2. (Note also that there is no logical impossibility in having a
"true" predicate, which likewise involves change over time, though
it presents problems for the explanation of induction.) Similarly,
we can recognize the existence of a logically possible world in
which a rule a is true at time T, but not at time T2, while a
different rule, inconsistent with rule a, is true at time T2.
Problems of logical possibility do not attach to this model of
rule change. Instead, they typically arise because there is some
problem within the rules of the rule system itself. "' Within a
regime of officially adopted rules there should be no logical
problem as long as the rules governing the making and changing
rules do not permit inconsistent rules to be authorized in the given
regime. Hart refers to these as "secondary rules."55 Such rules
determine and guide who it is that has the power to make and
change rules, what kinds of constraints are there on the content of
rules, and so on. Indeed, one of Lon Fuller's many enduring
contributions to legal theory is his observation that rule of law
values forbid, among others, the adoption and enforcement of
contradictory legal rules."
What is the significance of this for my larger argument
against defeasibility anti-deductivism? It is relevant and useful in
54. To take one example, consider the rules of "Whose Meaning Prevails" in
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 202. See supra note 17. Unless one adds to this
rule the additional rule "whoever actually knows the meaning of the other
party also has reason to know the meaning of the other party," this rule can

yield inconsistent outcomes in the case in which party A has reason to know
but does not actually know the competing meaning attached by party B and
party B actually knows but does not have reason to know the competing
meaning attached by party A.
55. See HART, supra note 52.
56. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 111-13.
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two ways. First, it is true that to show mere logical possibility is
not to show much. But since nothing can be actual without being
possible, it helps to see that the deductive punctuated equilibrium
model of change in rules is logically (and perforce metaphysically)
possible, because it helps prepare the intellectual ground for an
additional argument (beyond my scope in this article) that
deductive punctuated equilibrium is the best model for explaining
many changes in legal rules in actual-world legal systems.
Second, showing that the deductive punctuated equilibrium
model is logically possible helps to emphasize a way in which
Dewey's version of the defeasibility argument is misdirected.
Dewey presents that argument as a logically necessary truth about
the logical relations between general propositions and concrete
ones-namely, that the latter type of proposition cannot follow
deductively from the former type. I have already argued that this
leads him into a dilemma and yields at least one clear counterexample.57 The real force, and the real support for Dewey's
position must come not from its claims of metaphysical or logical
necessity but rather from its claims about the contingent facts of
legal rules and legal systems and legal officials in the actual
world. Dewey would have been better advised to defend, not
proposition
(17) No concrete proposition, that is to say one with
material dated in time and placed in space,
follows deductively from any general statements
or from any connection between them.
- but rather a proposition something like this:
(41) In actual legal systems, judges and lawyers do not
offer deductive arguments when they apply legal
rules to legal cases.
To be sure, a proposition like (41) would be hard to defend and
would need a good deal of qualification before it was even
plausible. Still, it does seem to me that the real energy and
plausibility of the Holmes-Dewey-Cohen view comes not in
contentions about logical relations (between concrete and general
propositions), but rather in contentions about how the language of
legal argument operates in the actual contextual settings in which
legal arguments are constructed and offered. I therefore want to
shift my focus a bit. I still want to defend the punctuated
deductive equilibrium model of legal-rule change, but I want to do
so by moving just a small step beyond showing the model is

57. See supra section II. B.
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logically possible. I want to sketch an argument that it also is a
plausible explanatory model of the contextual use of legal
arguments and legal rules in the actual world.
F.

"Deductiveopacity," contingency, and necessity in legal
argument

Whatever its strongest form, the basic defeasibility antideductivist view raises the following question: is there some
feature of the actual world that makes the deductive punctuated
equilibrium model explanatorily implausible for the actual world
of legal systems and legal rules? I believe, and shall argue, not.
Most, if not all of the force of the defeasibility anti-deductivist
view comes from its focus on the source of legal rules in the actual
world. Perhaps the most significant feature of legal realist legal
theory (taking Holmes and Dewey as leading representatives) is
its vigorous rejection of any "tender minded"58 metaphysical view
(often labeled "natural law") according to which legal rules are
timeless eternal truths in some kind of Platonic heaven of legal
concepts. The legal realists emphasized (as is characteristic of
legal positivist views generally) that the source of legal rules is
human agents, acting more or less in concert, in particular
circumstances, reacting to specific, earthly, earthy, concrete, nittygritty needs and beliefs, always having in mind particular goals
(not to mention hopes, fears, dreams, aspirations, and desires)
sometimes more, often less than fully consciously. Generalizations
about how such rules would be molded in light of particular
circumstances, these scholars believed, could at best be said to be
contingent probabilisticpredictions-indeed,this was the source
for Holmes' famous assertion (later picked up by Llewellyn, Felix
Cohen, and other realists) that what it meant to talk about "law"
was to talk about "prophecies" of actions by legal officials. 59 It is
this underlying view about the source of legal rules that led them
to highlight the fact of change in legal rules and to conclude from
facts about change in rules that legal arguments could not
properly be explained as deductions.
Dewey, Holmes, and generations of succeeding legal
academics believe that given the merely human, contingent,
empirical source of these rules only a defeasibility anti-deductivist
model of legal argument is plausible. Perhaps their strongest
evidence for this belief comes in their focus on the nature of legal
58. See

William

James,

The

Present Dilemma in

Philosophy, in

PRAGMATISM AND OTHER ESSAYS (1963).
59. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 1; KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH (1930); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
On the "prediction
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).

thesis" as a complete theory of law, see Brewer, Jurisprudence of Logical
Form, supra note 3.
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change: if rules are in a process of more frequent flux, those rules
cannot be said to be deductively applicable. Instead, in their view
the addition of new information about the world (taking the form
of new factual or theoretical premises) often undermines the force
of prior arguments. Thus consider what would seem to be a fair
interpretive reconstruction of an argument in a contracts case, in
which proposition
(42) Unless there is fraud or duress or mutual mistake,
every party who signs a contract is to be held to
its terms.
serves as the "major premise" of a legal syllogism, perhaps
completed by the addition of
(43) Eurice signed the contract and there was no fraud,
duress, or mutual mistake.
Therefore
(44) Eurice is to be held to its terms.

°

The omnipresent possibility of change in a legal rule like (42) is
very salient for a theorist who endorses the defeasibility antideductivist model. Such a theorist keeps firmly in view the fact (I
concede that this is a fact) that, in light of new empirical
information, whether about the nature of persons who might be
affected by rule (42) or about broader theoretical knowledge of the
world, or both, a future judge may well modify premise (and rule)
(42). Suppose for example that the person to whom "duty to read"
rule (42) is to be applied in a given case does not speak the
language in which the document he signed was written. A judge
faced with deciding such a case and also faced with an
authoritative precedent in which (42) had been stated and applied
by its terms, might still modify (42) so as to have it apply only to
persons who spoke the language of the document they signed.6'
Moreover, even if the later judge did not modify (42) in this or
some other way, he always (according to the defeasibilist) has the
option of doing so, and the very having of that option is enough to
prevent (42) from being a true, deductively applicable, universal
generalization.6 2 Thus, because of the ever present possibility that
60. See Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., Inc., 93 A.2d 272 (Md. 1952)
61. The process here would most likely be reasoning by disanalogy.

See

Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics,and the Rational

Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 925, 1017-21(1996).
62. This is a point emphasized by Felix Cohen. See text at note 36. See also
Cohen, supra note 36 at 217:
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a judge will choose not to treat two distinct fact patterns (parties,
etc.) as "the same" for purposes of legal argument, no rule like (42)
can be regarded as a true deductively applicable universal
generalization-so concludes the defeasibility anti-deductivist.
Dewey, Holmes, Cohen and their followers misunderstand the
consequences of an empiricist view about the source of legal rules
and misjudge the significance of the fact of legal rule change. I
shall conclude my defense of the "punctuated deductive
equilibrium" model's plausibility by defending two related claims.
First, it does not follow that, because the source of a set of rules
(legal or otherwise) is contingent that those rules cannot yield
valid deductive (and thus indefeasible) arguments. It does not
follow that, because those rules can and do change that they
cannot yield deductively valid arguments. To explain these two
closely related claims, I shall borrow and slightly modify a thought
experiment offered by philosopher Zeno Vendler to illustrate the
coordinate roles of necessary and contingent statements in
linguistics and philosophy of language.63
Suppose an anthropologist sets out to study the social
behavior of a tribe previously unknown to him. He manages to "go
native" enough to learn the tribe's language. While living in the
tribe, he discovers that many of its members routinely congregate
around two people who sit on either side of a square board marked
by sixty-four one-inch squares, alternately colored white and black
with no two contiguous squares having the same color. The two
people move shaped figurines on this board, sometimes for several
hours, while other members of the tribe look on with rapt
attentiveness, nods that seem like approval, and mutterings that
sound like expressions of admiration. Having discerned this
much, the anthropologist tries to explain what these two people
seated on either side of the board are doing and what the activity's
social significance is. After a great deal of study, querying both
tribe members he has seen moving the figurines on such boards
and tribe members he has seen looking on, the anthropologist
eventually figures out that these people are playing what we now
recognize as the game of chess, an activity hitherto unknown to
The question before the judge is, "Granted that there are differences
between the cited precedent and the case at bar, and assuming that the
decision in the earlier case was a desirable one, is it desirable to attach
legal weight to any of the factual differences between the instant case
and the earlier one?" Obviously this is an ethical question. Should a
rich woman accused of larceny receive the same treatment as a poor
woman? .... Neither the ringing hexameters of Barbara Celarent nor
the logic machine of Jevons nor the true-false patterns of Wittgenstein
will produce answers to these questions.

63. See Z. Vendler, Linguistics and the A Priori, in LINGUISTICS IN
PHILOSOPHY 1-32 (1967). See also Black, Necessary Statements and Rules, 66
PHILOSOPHICAL REv. 313-341 (1958).
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the anthropologist.
Through his careful observations and
confirming and disconfirming queries, the anthropologist discerns
(what we recognize as) the rules of chess, along with the
distinctions among the different chess pieces, the distinction (by
color) of one opponent's pieces from the other's, and the moves that
each piece is permitted to make.
Discerning the "rules of chess" in this way means discerning
which conditionalpropositionsare true within the official "regime"
of chess. " Suppose further that, in the course of discerning the
rules, the anthropologist "does the math" (as it were), and
determines that the following proposition is true under those rules:
(45) Whenever two pawns of the same color stand on
the same column, and the rules have been fully
observed, one of them must have taken an
opposing piece in a previous move.
What is the status of a proposition like (45)? To understand its
status we must be very clear about a crucial distinction: the
distinction between discerning what the rules are and discerning
whatpropositionsare true under the rules, once the rules have been
discerned. If the anthropologist is still unsure (or not sufficiently
sure) that he knows what are the officially recognized rules that
constitute the activity (game) he has been observing and trying to
explain, he might articulate (speak or write) (45) as a contingent,
empirical, probabilistic proposition: "Based on what I've seen so
far, it seems very likely that this is a true proposition under the
officially recognized rules." But once he is convinced that he does
know what the rules are, his articulation of (45) is no longer (or
anyway is much less likely to be) best understood, either by him or
by some other interpreter, as a contingent, probabilistic
statement. In this latter circumstance the proposition is better
taken as a conceptually necessary truth about the operation of the
rules. That is, once he has worked out, on the basis of empirical
investigation, what the rules are, he can go on to work out all
kinds of necessary consequences of that set of rules, considered as
an abstract logical structure. That these are the rules of the game
played in this tribe is contingently true. Statements of certain
conceptual relations among the rules, such as (45), are necessarily
true.
Assume now that the anthropologist occupies our actual
world (surely some process like this actually took place in the
cultural transmission of some games) and notice the way in which
the example illustrates how there can be a wholly coherent blend
of contingent and necessary truths about the game, from different

64. For the concept of an officially adopted rule, see HART, supra note 52.
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perspectives. Among the contingent propositions that are true in
the actual world are: that the names of the pieces were chosen as
they were in their original language (i.e., whatever the original
language's terms are for 'pawn', 'knight', 'bishop', etc.); that these
rules came to be adopted as the authoritative rules of this game;
that those persons in the community who came to have the
authority to create the game and modify its rules did come to have
that authority. All of those contingent facts (and a great many,
indeed an indefinite number more) had to be in place (i.e., true) in
the actual world in order for propositions about the consequences
of the rules (also indefinite in number), like (45), to be necessarily
true.
As this anthropology-chess example clearly (I hope)
illustrates, a system of deductively applicable rules that yields
indefinitely many necessary truths can have a contingent and
empirically discoverable provenance. Indeed, in relying so heavily
on the fact of the contingent source of legal rules to maintain that
legal argument is not deductive (i.e., is defeasible), Dewey, Holmes
and others seem to have overlooked a very common reasoning
practice that reflects exactly this distinction between the
deductive structure of a rule system and its contingent origin. I
shall refer to this phenomenon as deductive opacity. Consider the
standard syllogistic chestnut
(26) All men are mortal.
(29) Socrates is a man.
Therefore
(28) Socrates is mortal.
What is the logical status of proposition (26)? Virtually every
writer who adduces this deduction treats (26) as a true universal
generalization and thus as a proposition fully capable of yielding
deductively valid (and perforce indefeasible) conclusions. (Indeed,
Dewey himself clearly invokes it as an example of indefeasible
inference in the course of articulating and defending his
defeasibility thesis.65 ) But most of these writers would also not
deny that the truth of (26) can be established only by specific
empiricalfacts, so that, from the point of view of empirical science,
the warrantfor (26) is merely probabilistic and inductive. (26) can
serve as the major premise in this standard "Darii" syllogism
because of the "deductive opacity" of (26): in the context of drawing
inferences from (26), it is treated as if it is a true universal

65. See text at note 37.
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generalization. In such contexts, for context-driven purposes, (26)
is a true universal generalization and its ("merely") probabilistic,
inductive origin is hidden-it is opaque for those argumentative
purposes. Reasoners across the many domains of reasoning,
including empirical scientists, deploy this practice, which depends
on making and maintaining a clear distinction between the
original warrant for a proposition and its current logical structure
(e.g., universal generalization or instantiation, existential
generalization or instantiation).
The nineteenth century German legal historiographer
Frederick von Savigny understood and emphasized this point
about the deductive opacity of legal rules in actual legal systems.
(Much of what is overstated or misconceived in Holmes' antideductivist view of legal argument could have been avoided had he
been more attentive to Savigny's teachings.) It was Savigny's
closely related insight about the distinction between the
provenance of a rule system and its logical structure that led
Saviguy to argue that historicallycontingent legal systems could be
understood very much in the way that we understand the
anthropologist's empirical discovery of the rules of chess in a tribe.
Discussing "the origin of positive law," Savigny explains that,
throughout history:
the law will be found to have a fixed character, peculiar to the
people, like their language, manners, and constitution. Nay these
phenomena have no separate existence, they are but the particular
faculties and tendencies of an individual people, inseparably united
in nature.... Law grows with the growth, and strengthens with
the strength of the people, and finally dies away as the nation looses
its nationality./
Savigny saw too that recognizing the intensely local, historical,
culturally specific provenance of the rules of legal systems is
wholly consistent with essaying to study and organize the rules
thus empirically discovered into a logically coherent conceptual
system, a system that permits-to use Dewey's terms-the
deductive inference of "concrete" propositions from general ones.
Indeed, effecting just this kind of conceptual organization was, on
Savigny's view, one of the principle tasks for the jurist who would
legislate or otherwise seek to codify law:
Law ... has a twofold life; first, as part of the aggregate existence of
the community, which it does not cease to be; and, secondly, as a
distinct branch of knowledge in the hands of the jurists ....
[We
call .. the connection of law with the general existence of the
people -the political element; and the distinct scientific existence of
law-the technical element.

66. K. F. VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION

AND JURISPRUDENCE 24 (Abraham Hayward trans., 1975) (1831).
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In every triangle .... there are certain data, from the relations of
which all the rest are necessarily deduced: thus, given two sides and
the included angle, the whole triangle is given. In like manner,
every part of our law has points by which the rest may be given:
these may be termed the leading axioms. To distinguish these, and
deduce from them the internalconnection, and the precise degree of
affinity which subsist [sic] between all juridicalnotions and rules, is
amongst the most difficult problems of jurisprudence. Indeed, it is
peculiarly this which gives our labors the scientific character.
From their very different vantage points, both Vendler (the
chess-anthropology example) and Savigny support the punctuated
deductive equilibrium model of the change in legal rules against
the kind of defeasibility challenge leveled by Holmes, Dewey, and
others. Equipped with this model, one can for example explain
exactly what the problem is in cases like Joyner and Trans-Aire
(both discussed above). Recall that in Joyner the court seemed to
believe that its "re-restatement" of the terms of a Restatement
(Second) of Contracts rule regarding Whose Meaning Prevails
stated a rule that was identical, though phrased differently. 8
What is contingently true, and what is necessarily true in my
assertions about the court's reasoning? It is contingently true that
the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts chose the
exact terms they did choose for their rule 201(2). It is contingently
true that the Joyner court (apparently) sought to adopt that rule
as an authoritative rule for its jurisdiction. It is contingently true
that the Joyner court mistakenly concluded that its effort at
restating Restatement rule 201(2) was identical to the Restatement
rule itself. What is necessarily true is that the Joyner court's
stated version of the rule and argument proceeding therefrom-an
enthymeme that needed to be interpreted, to be sure, as I did in my
discussion above-is not identical to the Restatement (Second)
version." These kinds of observations about the consequences of
and relations among empirically discoverable legal rules are
statements of logical necessity. It's not "false necessity." It's just
necessity.
I hasten to add that nothing in the punctuated deductive
equilibrium model or its supporting arguments is committed to
maintaining that legal rules are "gapless," or that there are never
any conflicts among rules, or that there are no ambiguities or
vaguenesses within the rules. Moreover, nothing in the model or

67. VON SAVIGNY, supra note 66, at 38-39 (emphasis added). See also M. H.
Hoeflich, Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 95, 107-08 (1986).
68. See suprasection I. A.
69. Again, see section I. A. for the concept of the "identity" of a rule.
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its supporting arguments requires or even suggests that the mode
of reasoning judges and others use to close gaps, eliminate or
resolve ambiguities, conflicts, and vaguenesses, is always
deductive (though it is perhaps overlooked that sometimes such
resolutions are deductive-e.g., default rules that are deductively
applicable). Very often, perhaps most often, legal reasoners close
such gaps and resolve such conflicts among rules with the aid of
reflective adjustment of rules and outcomes, through the rational
instrument of reasoning by analogy or disanalogy. ° The crucial
point for my purposes here is that, however the gaps (etc.) are
closed, they are closed by effecting some change in the logical
criteria (necessary or sufficient conditions) of an existing legal
rule, or by the adoption of a new rule, or both. That kind of
change can be plausibly (indeed, I believe, fully) explained by the
punctuated deductive equilibrium model of the evolution of legal
rules, as long as one attends to the distinction between the
(empirical) provenance of a legal rule and its logical structure for
the purpose of argument. In this way, a proper understanding of
deductive opacity and the closely related distinction between the
provenance and the logical structure of rules systems provide
strong support for the punctuated deductive equilibrium model
and strongly undermine the defeasibility anti-deduction model.
Time for a quick look back over recently traveled terrain. In
the immediately foregoing sections my response to defeasibility
anti-deductivism has had elements of offense and defense, thrust
and parry, sword and shield. I have presented the punctuated
deductive equilibrium model of the evolution of legal rules as an
alternative to the defeasibility anti-deductivist model. I have also
argued that this alternative model is fully consistent with an
empiricist view (which I endorse) of the source of legal rules and
legal concepts. I hope I've also shown that, from a metaphysical
and logical point of view, not all legal arguments need be
explained as inevitably defeasible and, perforce, non-deductive.
The offensive (in one sense only, I hope), swordish part of this
discussion came in my suggestion that the defeasibility antideductivist position relies heavily on a failure to keep separate the
provenance of a legal rule and its logical structure.
CONCLUSION

In many ways, throughout its practices of constructing,
articulating, and applying legal rules and interpreting legal texts,
"Law" needs deductive logic. Law needs deduction not just as
window dressing,7" but as the very foundation of a system whose
70. See generally Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning, supra note 11.
71. See Holmes, The Pathof the Law, supra note 1, at 466 ("logical method

and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every
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central rational idea is that decisions are to be made and justified
on the basis of general reasonsapplied to particularcircumstances.
But for the reign of various overlapping forms of anti-deductivism
in American jurisprudence and legal pedagogy, one would have
thought this much could "go without saying." It hasn't gone that
way, so I say it now: logic, including but not limited to deductive
inference, is deeply and importantly relevant to legal argument
and to the legal practices that are to a great extent comprised of or
at least reliant on legal argument. This article has helped prepare
the way for a far more detailed and robust explanation of that
contention.

human mind. But certainty is generally an illusion ....
You can give any
conclusion a logical form.") See also LLEWELLYN, supra note 59, at 3-5
("[r]ules... are important so far as they help you.., predict what judges do..
. That is all their importance, except as pretty playthings.")

